Abstract. Side-channel attacks are a recent class of attacks that have been revealed to be very powerful in practice. By measuring some sidechannel information (running time, power consumption, . . . ), an attacker is able to recover some secret data from a carelessly implemented cryptoalgorithm. This paper investigates the Hessian parameterization of an elliptic curve as a step towards resistance against such attacks in the context of elliptic curve cryptography. The idea is to use the same procedure to compute the addition, the doubling or the subtraction of points. As a result, this gives a 33% performance improvement as compared to the best reported methods and requires much less memory.
Introduction
Side-channel attacks are a recent class of attacks that have been revealed to be very powerful in practice. By measuring some side-channel information (running time, power consumption, . . . ), an attacker is able to recover some secret data from a carelessly implemented crypto-algorithm. This paper investigates the Hessian parameterization of an elliptic curve as a step towards resistance against such attacks in the context of elliptic curve cryptography. The idea is to use the same procedure to compute the addition, the doubling or the subtraction of points. As a result, this gives a 33% performance improvement as compared to the best reported methods and requires much less memory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the theory of elliptic curves and reviews the related work for computing the multiple of a point on an elliptic curve. Section 3 presents the Hessian parameterization of an elliptic curve. It also proves some useful results on this special parameterization. The side-channel attacks are defined in Section 4 and some countermeasures are discussed. Finally, Section 5 shows how the Hessian parameterization helps to efficiently foil such attacks in the context of elliptic curve cryptography.
Elliptic Curve Multiplication
To ease the exposition we assume throughout this paper that K is a field of characteristic p > 3.
Basic facts
We start with a short introduction to elliptic curves. Definition 1. Up to a birational equivalence, an elliptic curve over a field K is a plane nonsingular cubic curve with a K-rational point.
Elliptic curves are often expressed in terms of Weierstraß equations:
where a and b ∈ K. The condition 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0 ensures that the discriminant
is nonzero, or equivalently that the points (x, y) on the curve are nonsingular. More importantly, together with the point at infinity O, the points of an elliptic curve form an Abelian group (with identity element O) under the chordand-tangent rule defined as follows. If P = (x 1 , y 1 ), then its inverse is given by −P = (x 1 , −y 1 ). The sum of two points P = (x 1 , y 1 ) and Q = (x 2 , y 2 ) (with Q = −P ) is equal to R = (x 3 , y 3 ) where
The previous formulae require 2 or 3 multiplications and 1 inversion to add two points. Since this latter operation is costly (an inversion roughly takes the same amount of time as 23 multiplications [8] ), projective representations of Weierstraß equations may be preferred.
Hessian Curves
In this section, we formally define the Hessian elliptic curves [10] (see also [2, p. 36] and [15] ) and give some results on this special parameterization. Definition 2. An Hessian elliptic curve over K is a plane cubic curve given by an equation of the form
or in projective coordinates,
where D ∈ K and D 3 = 1.
As shown in the next lemma, the condition D 3 = 1 imposes that the curve is nonsingular, that is, elliptic. Proof. Let P = (U 1 :
where ω is a non-trivial cubic root of unity. Together with Eq. (4), this yields 3k
Proposition 1. The Hessian curve given by Eq. (3) is birationnally equivalent to the Weierstraß equation
under the transformations
and
where η =
Proof. Sending the point P 0 = (0, −1) to the origin via the map
where 
Eq. (*) is birationnally equivalent to y
and, noting from Eq. (*) that 2c
Replacing now x by x + 9D 2 , we finally obtain the required equation and the corresponding transformations.
A 'straight-forward' application of the chord-and-tangent rule yields rather cumbersome formulae for the doubling and the addition on an Hessian curve. The correct way is to use the Cauchy-Desboves' s formulae (see Appendix A), which exploit the symmetry of Eq. (4). Plugging W = 0 into Eq. (4), we get the point at infinity O = (1 : −1 : 0). The inverse of O is O. For P = O we can work in affine coordinates. Let P = (u 1 , v 1 ) be a point on the curve. The line v = −u + (u 1 + v 1 ) contains the point P and, considering its projective version V = −U + (u 1 + v 1 )Z, it also contains the point at infinity O. Therefore, −P is the third point of intersection of this line connecting P and O with the curve.
, we obtain
) So, the u-coordinate of −P is v 1 , and hence its v-coordinate is u 1 , i.e., −P = (v 1 , u 1 ) or, in projective coordinates,
We use the same notations as in Appendix A. The tangent at P = (U 1 : V 1 : W 1 ) intersects the curve at the third point −2P whose coordinates are given by Eq. (15), with
and, by symmetry, −ψ
. Hence, with Eq. (8), we finally obtain
From Eq. (16) (in Appendix A), the line connecting the points P = (U 1 : V 1 : W 1 ) and Q = (U 2 : V 2 : W 2 ) intersects the curve at the third point
. We have
and thus, exploiting the fact that P and Q belong to the curve [9, no. 12], we obtain
Therefore, with Eq. (8), the sum R = P + Q is given by
We now study the points of order 2 and 3. We work in affine coordinates since we are looking at points P = O such that 2P = O or 3P = O. Let P = (u 1 , v 1 ). The condition 2P = O is equivalent to P = −P . Therefore, since −P = (v 1 , u 1 ), the points P = (u 1 , v 1 ) of order 2 are those for which u 1 = v 1 .
Suppose P = (u 1 , v 1 ) with u 1 = v 1 , that is, P , 2P = O. To find the points P of order 3, we use the doubling formula: 3P = O ⇐⇒ 2P = −P . So, a few algebra shows that the points of order 3 are exactly those with u 1 = 0 or v 1 = 0. In particular, the points (0, −1) and (−1, 0) have order 3.
Finally, it is interesting to note that a generic point P = (U : V : W ) on the Hessian curve (4) satisfies
where
Side-Channel Attacks
At crypto '96 and subsequently at crypto '99, Kocher et al. introduced a new class of attacks, the so-called side-channel attacks. By measuring some sidechannel information (e.g., timing [11] , power consumption [12] ), they were able to find the secret keys from tamper-resistant devices.
When only a single measurement is performed the attack is referred to as simple side-channel attack, and when there are several correlated measurements sometimes it is referred to as a differential side-channel attack. The main concern at the moment for public-key cryptography are the simple side-channel attacks [12] . Efficient countermeasures are known for exponentiation-based cryptosystems (e.g., [4] ), but they require the atomic operations to be indistinguishable. For elliptic curve cryptography, the atomic operations are addition, subtraction and doubling of points. Within the Weierstraß model, as suggested in [1] , these operations appear to be different and some secret information may therefore leak through side-channel analysis.
The next section shows that the Hessian parameterization allows one to implement the same algorithm for the addition (or subtraction) of two points or for the doubling of a point. Figure 1 gives a detailed implementation to add two (different) points on an Hessian curve. The algorithm requires 12 multiplications (or 10 multiplications if one point has its last coordinate equal to 1) and 7 temporary variables.
Implementing the Hessian Curves
We note that there are variants for this implementation. For instance, we are able to describe similar implementations with only 4 auxiliary variables and 18 multiplications, 5 auxiliary variables and 16 multiplications, and 6 auxiliary variables and 14 multiplications.
More remarkably, owing to the high symmetry of the Hessian parameterization, the same algorithm can be used for doubling a point. We have:
Furthermore, we have (W 1 :
Proof. Addition formula (10) yields (W 1 :
by Eq. (9).
Input: = (U1 : V1 : W1) and The second part of the proposition follows by contradiction. Suppose that (W 1 :
, that there exists some t ∈ K * s.t. W 1 = tV 1 , U 1 = tW 1 and V 1 = tU 1 . This implies W 1 = 0 and t 3 = 1. Moreover, since (U 1 : In [13] , Liardet and Smart suggest to represent elliptic curves as the intersection of two quadrics in P 3 as a means to protect against side-channel attacks. Considering the special case of an elliptic curve whose order is divisible by 4 (i.e., the Jacobi form), they observe that the same algorithm can be used for adding and doubling points with 16 multiplications (see also [3] for the formulae). Using the proposed Hessian parameterization, only 12 multiplications are necessary for adding or doubling points. The Hessian parameterization gives thus a 33% improvement over the Jacobi parameterization. Another advantage of the Hessian parameterization is that points are represented with fewer coordinates, which results in substantial memory savings.
Finally, contrary to other parameterizations, there is no (field) subtraction to compute the inverse of a point (see Eq. (8)). Hence, our addition algorithm can be used as is for subtracting two points P = (U 1 : V 1 : W 1 ) and Q = (U 2 : V 2 : W 2 ) on an Hessian elliptic curve:
To sum up, by adapting the order of the inputs accordingly to Eq. (13) or (14) , the addition algorithm presented in Fig. 1 can be used indifferently for -adding two (different) points;
-doubling a point; -subtracting two points; with only 12 multiplications and 7 auxiliary variables including the 3 result variables. This results in the fastest known method for implementing the elliptic curve scalar multiplication towards resistance against side-channel attacks.
A Cauchy-Desboves' s Formulae Let F (U, V, W ) = 0 be the (homogeneous) equation of a general cubic curve and let P 1 = (U 1 : V 1 : W 1 ) and P 2 = (U 2 : V 2 : W 2 ) be two points on the curve.
We let denote ϕ = 
Moreover, the secant joining P 1 and P 2 intersects the curve at the third point [9, Eq. (16)] given by 
B Samples
Here are two examples of cryptographic Hessian elliptic curves E D (F p ) defined over the prime field F p with p = 2 160 − 2933 and p = 2 224 − 2 10 − 1, respectively. Both curves are adapted from [6] using Proposition 1. Note that since (0, −1) is on the curve whatever the values of D and p and that this point has order 3, the order of an Hessian curve, #E D (F p ), is always a multiple of 3. Note also that this specialized representation does not impact the security of the resulting cryptographic applications. 
